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Abstract
Focusing on the Government of Ontario's unwillingness to call a public inquiry into the death or Dudley
George, an Aboriginal protester, and the Government of Canada's willingness to interfere with an inquiry into
the deployment of Canadian forces to Somalia, this article argues that governments appear increasingly
reluctant to support a commission of inquiry into a public crisis even where it can serve as a catalyst for
addressing larger and more pressing concerns of institutional and policy reform. It first addresses "start-up
problems" associated with the fact that the decision to appoint a commission of inquiry lies within the sole
discretion of cabinet. It also canvasses incentives and disincentives on political actors and the media to call for
the establishment of a commission of inquiry. It then examines "shut down problems" associated with
governmental efforts to prematurely end or restrict a commission's activity. Borrowing several features from
the Independent Counsel and the Inspector General Models in the United States, the article proposes that the
Law Commission of Canada act as a permanent base of operations for federal commissions of inquiry, and
suggests that commissions of inquiry adopt non-confrontational methods and procedures that encourage
governments and other parties to sit down and engage in a constructive exercise of fact-finding, polity
formulation and structural reform.
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Commissions of Inquiby
I. INTRODUCTION
The commission of inquiry is a time-honoured institutional
mechanism for the formulation of public policy in Canada.' Statutory
provisions for the establishment of commissions of inquiry were first
introduced in the Province of Canada in 18462 and have become a
permanent feature of federal and provincial political life. Since
Confederation, the federal government has established over four hundred
commissions of inquiry to examine a wide array of matters of public
concern, including allegations of vaongdoing by the RCMP, challenges
posed by reproductive technologies, and the social, economic and legal
circumstances of Aboriginal peoples." Provincial governments have also
relied heavily on commissions of inquiry to examine and report on matters
of public concern. Since Confederation, Ontario, for example, has
established over four hundred commissions of inquiry to investigate matters
as diverse as attempts to bribe members of the legislature and the
development of the province's mineral resources.4
The commission of inquiry has had a lasting presence in Canadian
political life because it has performed a number of valuable public policy
functions. A commission of inquiry can exercise vde-ranging investigative
authority to uncover facts concerning matters of substantial public
importance. A commission of inquiry also can inform and educate citizens
about such matters Moreover, commissions of inquiry are often able to
1 A commission of inquiry can take a number of forms, including Ro al Commisiens, inquiries
by statutory or regulatory bodies, and departmental and inter-departmental policy studies. See
generally M. Trebilcock & L Austin, "The Limits of the Full Court Pres5: Of Blood and Mergers"
(1998) 4S U.T.L-J. 1 at 7: "[these different forms of public inquiry %ary videly in terms of political
accountability, political dynamics, participation; visibility; timing; and costs," This paper's primary
focus is on commissions of inquiry established pursuant to general enabling legislation, such as the
federal Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 19S5, c. I-11 [hereinafter nqunesAct],2An Act To Empower Comussions Forlnquring lntolatcrs Connected th Th bic BncMs-=
To Take Evidence Under Oath, 1846,9 Vict., c. 3S (Prov, Can.).
3 See G.F. Henderson, Federal Royal Conunissions in Canada: 1867-1q66.. chcedtst (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1967).
4 See generally Ontario Law Reform Commission, Rcprit en Public lnqtncs (Toronto: Ontario
Laxw Reform Commission, 1992) at 7-8 [hereinafter OLRCI. See also L Maillet, Proymcial Ral
Commissions and Commissions of Ihuiry: I67-19SI- A Selct Bibhivjraphy (Ottawa: The Nattonal
Library of Canada, 19S6).
5 See, for example, S.G.M. Grange, "How Should Lawwers and the Legal Profession Adapt?" in
A. P. Gross, I. Christie & . A. Yogis, eds., Commsisions of Inquiq, (Toronto: Cars- ell, 1990) 151 at
155:"I realized that there was another purpose to the inquiry just as imrortant as one man'sW soution
to the mystery and that was to inform the public. Merely presenting the etdence in pubzi;, e :idnce
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investigate, inform, and educate in ways superior to the mechanisms
available to the judicial and legislative branches of government. The
judicial process, according to the Ontario Law Reform Commission, tends
to assign blame by "fragment[ing] issues into a limited set of categories
established by existing norms," whereas a commission of inquiry enables a
broader examination of social causes and conditions.6 Unlike legislative
institutions, commissions of inquiry are, ideally, free of partisan loyalties,
better able to devote the appropriate time, resources and expertise, and can
take a long-term view of the problem. At their best, commissions of inquiry
generate "innovative discourses of development that merge public
philosophy with programmatic ideas unlike those attempted, much less
produced, by any other institution or organization in the Canadian political
system." 7 Accordingly, commissions of inquiry often perform an important
social function, by contributing to "a dramatic transformation in popular
perceptions of some previously poorly illuminated aspects of Canadian
society and institutions. " s Together, these investigative, informative,
educational and social functions enable commissions of inquiry to make
governments more accountable and responsive to the economic, social and
political needs and aspirations of Canadian citizens.
It has become apparent, however, that the capacity of the
commission of inquiry to secure governmental accountability is beginning
to falter. Fearing adverse political consequences, governments increasingly
appear reluctant to establish commissions of inquiry into public crises that
merit independent investigation. For example, despite the fact that the
incident raises important questions of public policy, the Government of
Ontario has stubbornly refused to establish a commission of inquiry into
circumstances surrounding the 1995 shooting death by provincial police of
Dudley George, an unarmed Aboriginal man who participated in an
occupation of a provincial park on disputed Aboriginal territory.9
which had hitherto been given only in private, served that purpose. The public has a special interest,
a right to know and a right to form its opinion as it goes along."
6 OLRC, supra note 4 at 11.
7N. Bradford, Commissioning Ideas: Canadian National Policy Innovation in Comparative
Perspective (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 159.
8 OLRC, supra note 4 at 12.
9 Resistance to the establishment of a commission of inquiry into politically sensitive matters is
not restricted to the provincial sphere, as exhibited by the federal government's ongoing refusal to
appoint an inquiry into the "Grand-Mre Inn scandal," in which Prime Minister Chrrtien lobbied the
Business Development Bank of Canada to extend a loan to a hotel adjacent to a golf course in which
he held a 25 per cent interest. See "Clouds of scandal gather in Ottawa" National Post ( 24 March
[VOL. 39, NO. I
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Moreover, governments increasingly appear willing to interfere with the
mandates and timing of ongoing inquiries. Although commissions of
inquiry in Canada have traditionally been allowed to run their course, the
federal government's decision to wind up the work of the inquiry into the
deployment of Canadian forces to Somalia, which was upheld by the
Federal Court of Appeal in Dixon v. Canada, signals that in the future
governments may be more willing to interfere in the work of commissions
of inquiry. 0
Commissions of inquiry come in all federal and provincial" shapes
and sizes, ranging from broad-gauged research commissions to
retrospective investigations into specific actions that contributed to a
particular public crisis. Commissions of inquiry that focus on retrospective
allocations of fault and blame run the risk of being little more than poor
imitations of our civil or criminal justice systems. Inquiries that focus on
"who did what to whom" invite due process challenges from those under
review. Publicity may taint the fairness of any parallel legal proceedings.
But, despite the benefits of the former and the flaws of the latter,
commissions of inquiry cannot be neatly divided into those that involve
matters of public policy and those that investigate alleged misconduct.'2
Most commissions of inquiry perform both functions, and "can be arranged
on a continuum with respect to the emphasis given to each aspect of their
work." 3 This dual function may be a reason that governments appear
increasingly reluctant to support a commission of inquiry into a public crisis
even where it can serve as a catalyst for addressing larger and more
2001) A15.
10 Nor is interference with an ongoing commission of inquiy retricted to the federal sphere, a5
illustrated by the decision by British Columbia to terminate a public inquit into the diversion of
approximately $2 million in bingo profits from legitimate charities to party and cabinet muntetr
accounts. At the time it was terminated, the inquiy had nearly completcd its final repart. See
"Bingogate probe point man slams inquiry shutdoan" licina Tmes Ce!enist (30 June 2101) ,A3.
11 And sometimes federal and provincial: the Royal CommiJs-on on the Ocean Ranger Marine
Disaster, established in 1932 when eighty-four %, orkers died after the eapiae of a zemi.submersible
drilling unit in the Atlantic Ocean, was a federal-provncial joint commini:n.
12 But see Law Reform Commission of Canada. Commssions ofltnzxtry (Worhing Paper 17)
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 197S) and Law Reform Commu --on of Canzda, Adt usei
and Investigatory Commissions (Report 13) (Ottava: Minister of Supply and Services. 1979).
13 L Salter, "The Two Contradictions in Public Inquiries." in Gro , Christie & YQot_ ed,,
Commissions of nquby-supra note 5. 173 at 176.
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pressing concerns of institutional and policy reform.1 4 The result is that the
utility of the commission of inquiry as an instrument of long-term policy
reform is compromised by the short-term fear of adverse political
consequences associated with the retrospective allocation of blame.
Given that governments now seem to "know when to hold them,
and know when to fold them," it is worth exploring other mechanisms that
can provide policy guidance when governments are reluctant to establish
or to support a commission of inquiry. This article explores two American
alternatives to the commission of inquiry. The first, made infamous by
Kenneth Starr's obsessive fascination with the sexual life of the president
of the United States, is the Independent Counsel model, established post-
Watergate, under the Ethics in Government Act.' 5 The second, less well
known alternative is the Inspector General model enacted by the Inspector
General Act,t6 which authorizes the creation of departmental offices to
detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in government. In light of
governments' incentives and disincentives to establish or to shut down
independent investigations of governmental actions, we examine both
alternatives to determine whether they rely on institutional mechanisms
that might enable commissions of inquiry to perform their accountability
function more effectively. Finally, we propose a revised mandate for the
Law Commission of Canada, which would enable it to serve as a permanent
base of operations for commissions of inquiry into matters falling within
federal jurisdiction that merit independent investigation. If successful, this
reform could serve as a model for provincial law reform commissions in the
future.
In light of the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. George,
Part II of the article examines "start up problems," namely, problems
associated with the fact that the decision to appoint a commission of
inquiry lies within the sole discretion of the federal or provincial cabinet.
It also canvasses incentives and disincentives on the governing party,
opposition parties, and the media to establish or call for the establishment
of a commission of inquiry. In light of the circumstances surrounding the
Somalia inquiry, Part III examines "shutdown problems," namely, problems
We do not wish to overstate this point, especially in light of the decision of the Ontario
government in 2000 to establish a commission of inquiry with a wide ranging mandate to examine
water contamination in the town of Walkerton. See "Rules set for 'sweeping' water inquiry" The
Ottawa Citizen (14 June 2000) A4.
1528 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
165 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-12 (1994).
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associated with governmental efforts to end prematurely or to restrict a
commission's activity. This Part considers the effect that the decision in
DLvon may have on governments choosing to shut down inquiries.
Part IV of the article assesses whether two American models
provide superior methods of securing political and governmental
accountability, specifically, the Independent Counsel model and the
Inspector General model. Borrowing a number of features from each
model, Part V proposes that an enhanced and expanded Law Commission
act as a permanent base of operations for federal commissions of inquiry.
It examines a variety of triggering mechanisms that would reduce or
eliminate the sole discretion of cabinets to establish commissions ofinquiry.
In particular, this approach requires that commissions of inquiry adopt
methods and procedures that are non-confrontational and encourage
governments and other parties to sit down and engage in a constructive
exercise of fact-finding, policy formulation, and structural reform.
IL START UP PROBLEMS
In 1995, approximately twenty-four men, women and children of
the Kettle and Stony Point First Nation peacefully occupied Ipperwash
Provincial Park at a time when the park was closed to the public. Adjacent
to the park was Camp Ipperwash, once used by the Department of National
Defence as a military base. But since 1993, it had also been occupied by
members of the First Nation. Kettle and Stony Point people have lived in
the area since time immemorial and they claimed and continue to claim
that both the park and the military base form part of their ancestral
territories.
Adjacent to the park is a sand-covered roadway which permits
access to a beach bordering Lake Huron. By the evening of 6 September
1995, there was a build-up of Ontario Provincial Police officers at a site
approximately one half kilometre west of the park. A tactical operation
centre had been set up at that location. The Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU)
was responsible for providing cover for a thirty-two person Crowd
Management Unit (cMu). At approximately 10:45 in the evening, the CmU
started marching in a cordon up the road towards the Aboriginal protesters
from the tactical operation centre.
At this time, the Aboriginal protesters were on the far side of the
fence which borders the park and separates it from the sand-covered
roadway. The TRU team had moved ahead of the cMu to secure the site. At
one point the cMu was advised to split into two groups and to stay low to
the ground because of the sighting of what could have been a firearm. Once
it was determined that the object was not a firearm, the CMNI told the
2001]
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Aboriginal protesters to get out of the park. The protesters shone spotlights
on the officers. Some protesters threw sticks, some which were on fire,
stones, and rocks at the CMU. A "go" order was given, and the officers
broke formation and began striking the protesters with batons. As one of
the protesters was allegedly being beaten by some of the CMU members, at
least fifteen of the protesters climbed over the fence and began to fight with
the CMU in an attempt to rescue him.
Almost simultaneously a large yellow school bus left the park, hit
a garbage dumpster on the way out and drove in the direction of the
officers, forcing them to scatter and retreat. A car followed the path taken
by the bus. The car hit several CMU officers while others took evasive
action. As the bus and car reversed, a number of officers opened fire. The
protesters began to retreat and seek cover when the gunfire began. Dudley
George, one of the protesters, was injured by gunfire. He was heard yelling
out that he had been hit. He was helped to a car by two of his colleagues
and was taken to Strathroy General Hospital where he was pronounced
dead at 2:00 in the morning, on 7 September 1995. Doctor Michael
Shkrum, a pathologist, performed an autopsy the following day. He
determined that a bullet had entered George's left clavicle area, resulting
in extensive bleeding. It was subsequently determined that the bullet that
caused the death of George was fired from a police issue semi-automatic,
Hoeckler and Koch nine millimetre carbine, registered to Sgt. Kenneth
Deane, a member of the TRU Sargeant Deane has since been charged and
convicted of criminal negligence causing death.'
7
The government of Ontario has steadfastly maintained that it did
not interfere with the operations of the Ontario Provincial Police (oPP) and
that it "gave no direction" and "had no influence" on the operations of 6
September 1995.8 However, on 5 September 1995, twenty-three people
gathered at Queens Park for a three-hour meeting of the Interministerial
Committee on Emergency Planning for Aboriginal Issues. Someone at this
meeting reportedly urged the OPP to "get the fucking Indians out of the
1 7 tX v. Deane, [1997] O.J. No. 3057 (Prov. Div.) per Justice Fraser. An appeal to the Ontario
Court of Appeal was dismissed on 18 February 2000: (2000), 143 C.C.C. (3d) 84; and an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed on 26 January 2001: [2001] 1 S.C.R. 279. The description of
the facts in this paragraph and the previous three paragraphs was taken from Justice Fraser's decision.
J. Rusk, "Harris Called to Testify in Slaying - Premier defends role, denies government
interference at Ipperwash" The Globe andMail (19 August 1997) A14.
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park." 9 According to notes obtained by the Canadian Press, that meeting
concluded with the agreement that "the province will take steps to remove
the occupiers ASAP." 2° On 6 September, the same group met, and according
to minutes obtained by the Canadian Press, the committee concluded that
"there will be no negotiations with the Stony Pointers regarding their claim
to ownership of the land and that the goal of any discussions would be the
removal of the occupiers from the park."'- Again according to the
Canadian Press, Deb Hutton, a senior aide to Premier Mike Harris, told
the meeting that "she had talked to the premier the previous evening and
his message had been that he wanted the natives 'out of the park-nothing
else." ' 22 Dudley George was killed less than twelve hours after the 6
September meeting adjourned. If accurate, the minutes and notes of these
two meetings make it clear that the political staff to the Premier and other
cabinet ministers took an active role in the interministerial strategy
developed in response to the occupation.
We recite these events to illustrate the fact that a number of start
up problems confront the capacity of a commission of inquiry to serve as
an effective instrument of public policy. The death of Dudley George raises
a wide range of policy concerns including: the adequacy of existing
procedures and protocols addressing potential or actual conflict betveen
Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal people on disputed Aboriginal
ancestral territory; the institutional relationship between the Government
of Ontario and the Ontario Provincial Police; the authority of provincial
police forces over Aboriginal communities and Aboriginal disputes; short
and long term causes and remedies for the dispute in question; and the
need to determine what preventative measures might minimize the
occurrence of a similar chain of events in the future. Despite these
compelling policy concerns and the fact that there are no legal barriers to
the establishment of a commission of inquiry, the Government of Ontario,
19J. Rusk, "Ipperwash Rife With Unanswered Questions - Aboriginal lcaders. oppation
politicians renew calls for public inquiry in wake of O.PP. Officer's Eentence" The Gl e and Mad (4
July 1997) A4.
20 R. Mackie, 'Tolerance Ended at Ipperwash -The Ontariogovernment stoppled asofterp licy
for Native protests soon after it took power in June, 1995, notes from meeting obtained earlier tht5
week show" The Globe and Mail (2 August 1997) A4.
2 1 bi
22 Ibid
23 See P. Macklem, Opinion Letter to Ms. Ann Pohl, Coalition for a Public Inquiry into Matters
Relating to the Death of Mr. Dudley George (S September 1993) (on file vath authors).
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citing its desire to allow legal proceedings to take their course,'4 has
consistently refused to hold an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding
Dudley George's death.
A. Current Statutory Provisions Governing the Establishment
of Public Inquiries
Commissions of inquiry may be established by either the federal25
or provincial governments.26 The federal statute provides that: "The
Governor in Council may, whenever the Governor in Council deems it
expedient, cause inquiry to be made into and concerning any matter
connected with the good government of Canada or the conduct of any part
of the public business thereof."27A similar provision is found in section 2 of
the Ontario Public InquiriesAct.2 Such provisions confer a broad discretion
on governments to choose whether or not to set up a commission of
inquiry. The only statutory prerequisite to the exercise of this discretion is
the subjective belief that such an inquiry is expedient. The exercise of
discretion is not limited by a requirement to demonstrate the existence of
any particular conditions or the objective reasonableness of the decision to
conduct an inquiry.
The decision whether or not to hold a commission of inquiry
therefore rests solely within the discretion of the cabinet. As illustrated by
the Government of Ontario's refusal to establish an inquiry into
circumstances surrounding the death of Dudley George, governments in
Canada are not legally required to establish commissions of inquiry upon
24 In addition to the criminal trial and appeal of Sgt. Deane, friends and family of Mr. George
have filed a civil action against Premier Mike Harris, Attorney General Charles Harnick, Solicitor
General Robert Runciman, O.P.P. Commissioner Thomas O'Grady, O.P.P. Superintendent
Christopher Coles, and other individuals.
25 Inquiries Act, supra note 1.
26 For example, Public Inquiries Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.41 [hereinafter Ontario Public Inquiries
Act]; InquiryAct, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 224; Public InquiriesAct, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-29; The Public Inquiries
Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-38; Inquiries Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. I-Il and Corrupt Practices Inquiry Act,
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-27; Public Inquiries Act, R.S.Y. 1986 c. 137.
27 Inquiries Act, supra note 1, s. 2.
2 8 
"Whenever the Lieutenant Governor in Council considers it expedient to cause inquiry to be
made concerning any matter connected with or affecting the good government of Ontario or the
conduct of any part of the public business thereof or of the administration ofjustice therein or that the
Lieutenant Governor in Council declares to be a matter of public concern and the inquiry is not
regulated by any special law, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may, by commission, appoint one
or more persons to conduct the inquiry." Ontario Public Inquiries Act, supra note 26, s. 2.
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the occurrence of any particular event or upon the request of any individual
or group. This approach is different from that under the Ontario Coroners
Act, which requires a coroner to issue a warrant to hold an inquest where
the individual died while in police custody, while an inmate of a
correctional institute, as a result of an accident occurring during the course
of employment in a construction project, mining plant or mine.
If a government decides to establish a commission of inquiry, it is
also free to select the members of the commission and set out the
commission's terms of reference by an order in council. The terms of
reference will usually contain specific objective limits on the scope of the
inquiry which may not be altered by the commission and provide some
subjective discretion to the commissioners to extend the investigation. 2
Terms of reference guide the commission and some commentators have
suggested that terms of reference have "seldom" been used to restrict the
activities of inquiries.3' Under the Ontario Public Inquiries Act, the
commission or a person affected may state a case to the Divisional Court
in situations in which the authority to appoint a commission under theAct
or the authority of a commission to do any act or thing proposed to be done
or done by the commission in the course of its inquiry is called into
question.3'2 Should a government choose to create a commission of inquiry,
the scope for judicial review of this decision is, in practice, limited to the
narrow grounds of bias or bad faith," or for violations of the constitutional
distribution of legislative authority.'
B. Incentives and Disincentives Created by Current Statutory Provisions
Given that there is no statutory requirement for a government to
ever appoint a commission of inquiry, what incentives drive governments
29 CoranersAct, R.S.O. 1990, c C.37, s. 10(4) and (5).
30 These limits are enforceable in court and subject tojudtcial interprctation: OLRCsupra note
4 at 28-29.
31 N. d'Ombrain, "Public Inquiries in Canada" (1997) 40 Can. Pub. Admin. C6 at 94. But E-ze Re
Nelles et aL and Grange et aL (1934), 46 OR. (2d) 210 at 221 (CAk) %here the Court of Appal
interpreted the provision in the terms of reference preventing the commzT=on from "enprcmng any
conclusion of law regarding civil or criminal responsibihty' to prohibit the comm=ion from naming
the person responsible for administering a lethal dose of digo'an.
3 2 Ontario Public Inquiries Act, supra note 26, s. 6.
33 OLRC, supra note 4 at 27.
34 ConstitutionAc4 1867(U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C 1935. App. lI,No. S. Sze,
for example, Starrv. Houlden, [1990 I S.C.R. 1366 [hereinafter Startl.
2001]
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to appoint commissions of inquiry? What are the disincentives that make
governments reluctant to appoint commissions? While the particular
incentives at play in any particular situation will vary widely, certain
patterns and disincentives can be discerned.
1. Government Incentives to Call Public Inquiries
One of the strongest incentives for a government to call an inquiry
is the belief that appointing a commission will remove an unpleasant
controversy from the political agenda." Commissions are most frequently
appointed in the wake of a major tragedy, scandal, government misconduct,
systemic problems, or other public crises.36 The government of the day will
be under significant pressure to respond quickly to such an episode. Facing
the relentless daily pressure of the media, cabinet ministers and caucus
members often see a commission of inquiry as a way of relieving intolerable
political pressure and changing the "climate of crisis." 37 This incentive may
be more powerful when the climate of crisis emerges in the lead up to an
election.38 In short, the decision to appoint a commission of inquiry "is
often dictated by the political exigencies of a public controversy rather than
as a matter of deliberate executive choice."3 9
A government may also have an incentive to establish a commission
of inquiry where the incident in question happened on the watch of a
previous government. A government may believe that political risks
associated with an inquiry are less when the events in question pre-date its
election. However, given the independence of a commission of inquiry, and
the unpredictable nature of its investigation, this incentive may not be as
strong as it would at first seem. As we discuss in Part III, the Somalia
inquiry, commenced by a Liberal government to investigate events that
35 P. Desbarats, "The Independence of Public Inquiries: Dixon v. Canada" (1997) 36 Alta L. Rev.
252 at 253.
3 6 C.E. Singley, "The MOVE Commission: The Use of Public Inquiry Commissions to Investigate
Government Misconduct and Other Matters of Vital Public Concern" (1986) 59 Temp. L.Q. 303 at
311; D'Ombrain, supra note 31 at 91.
37 D'Ombrain, ibid. at 93.
38 Some authors have suggested that the Krever Commission was "set up to deflect criticism in
the midst of a general election." D'Ombrain, ibid. at 94.
39 Singley, supra note 36 at 307.
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transpired under the previous Conservative administration, highlights the
political risks inherent in such an inquiry' t"
A third incentive is at play when the government feels that it has
been wrongly accused of misfeasance or negligence. In such situations
rumours and what is perceived by the government as misinformation may
seriously damage the political credibility of the governing party. The
government may feel that it is simply unable to assert credibly that all is
well. The pronouncement of an independent inquiry absolving the
government of wrongdoing enjoys a credibility and legitimacy that partisan
government protestations will never have. This incentive will be strongest
when the government perceives that the likelihood of the commission
criticizing its conduct is most remote. This incentive could create a perverse
outcome: it could make the establishment of a commission of inquiry most
likely in precisely the circumstances where one is needed least.
A fourth incentive is at work when the government is considering
establishing a commission to provide ar ante policy advice. Examples of
such commissions include the Commission of Inquiry Into the Non-Medical
Use of Drugs (the Le Dain Commission), the Royal Commission on
Taxation (the Carter Commission), or the Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies. The public education function of commissions
of inquiry creates an incentive to establish a commission in circumstances
in which the government wishes to focus the media's and the general
public's attention to an important area of public policy. In such
circumstances, the government may wish to delay, avoid, or prepare the
public for decisions, by appointing a commission of inquiry in controversial
orpoliticallyunpopular areas of public policy' Commissions of inquiry can
prepare public opinion for changes in public policy where change is
otherwise unlikely. In fact, the very appointment of a commission of inquiry
performs an important signalling function by stamping the commission's
focus as one worthy of social attention. In this way, commissions can play
an important catalytic role in stimulating public awareness of pressing
social problems.4 2
40 D'Ombrain, supra note 31 at 104.
41D'Ombrain, ibid at 93.
42 K. Roach, "Public Inquiries, Prosecutions or Both'?" (1994) 43 U.N B I. 415 at 4ZO; G. e
Dain, "The Role of the Public Inquiry in our Constitutional System" n J, Zicgeld., La-waJniS :ta
Change (Toronto: Osgoode Hall, 1973) 79 at 83. See also Singleysupra note 36 at 395-357.
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2. Government Disincentives to Call Public Inquiries
Most, if not all, of the disincentives governments face when
deciding whether to establish a commission of inquiry flow from a basic
problem: the loss of control over the process and the outcome of the
commission. In order to have any credibility as a mechanism of
accountability an inquiry must have complete independence from
government interference.4 3 To be effective, commissions of inquiry cannot
be subject to political influence or pressure." Historically, governments
have had little, if any, control over the direction or outcome of the inquiry
once commissioners are selected and terms of reference are drafted.
This independence limits a government's ability to control the
duration of the inquiry and its associated costs. For example, the Krever
Commission was directed to report within twelve months. By the time the
Krever Commission finally reported, four years later, it had spent $17.5
million, directly conducted 247 days of hearings comprising 53 lawyers, 474
witnesses, and 175,000 documents.4 5 Moreover, the time taken by the
Krever Commission may "have undermined the usefulness of the report"
as federal and provincial governments elected to implement changes to
Canada's blood system without the benefit of the Commission's final
report.46
A commission of inquiry's independence also limits a government's
ability to shape public opinion about the subject matter under investigation.
Accordingly, a commission of inquiry is a more unpredictable instrument
for the formulation of public policy than a bureaucratic study.47 The
decision to establish a commission of inquiry to obtain ex ante policy advice
requires the government to surrender a degree of control over its policy
agenda and, in particular, "its initiative to identify the issues and to create
public expectations ... as to what is a reasonable legislative approach. '
48
Finally, the fear that the commission will not absolve the
government from blame or responsibility is another disincentive to
43 K. Roach, "Canadian Public Inquiries and Accountability" in P. Stenning, cd.,Accountability
for Criminal Justice: Selected Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) 268 at 277.
44 Le Dain, supra note 42 at 82.
45 Trebilcock & Austin, supra note 1 at 34.
46 See generally Trebilcock & Austin, supra note I; D'Ombrain, supra note 31 at 100.
47M.J. Trebilcock et al., The Choice of Governing Instrument (Ottawa: Economic Council of
Canada, 1982) at 37-50.
48 Le Dain, supra note 42 at 80.
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establishing a commission of inquiry. For example, given that there are no
legal barriers to the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the death of Dudley George, the Government
of Ontario's refusal to hold an inquiry can only be explained in terms of a
politically-motivated unwillingness to subject certain decisions, procedures,
and actions to public scrutiny. A commission of inquiry that concludes that
state actors did not perform their duties properly "has serious implications
for the credibility and legitimacy of the appointing executive." ° It is much
easier for a government to minimize the damage of attacks by members of
the opposition as partisan posturing, than to evade the findings of a
commission of inquiry.50 The fear that the government could be
embarrassed by revelations at commission hearings or by the release of a
commission's report, therefore, serves as a significant disincentive to the
establishment of a commission of inquiry.
3. Opposition Incentives and Disincentives
Political opponents of any administration frequently find it in their
political interest to call for the investigation of "some real, possible or even
wholly imagined wrongdoing" by a government actor 5' The Liberal Party
of Ontario and the Ontario New Democratic Party, for example, have
consistently called the Government of Ontario to task for its failure to
establish a commission of inquiry into circumstances surrounding the death
of Mr. George. The fact that opposition politicians so frequently call for
commissions of inquiry into government misfeasance is itself evidence that
there are strong incentives for them to do so. Moreover, w.,here there is
more than one opposition party in the legislature, there is likely a first-
mover advantage. This will create incentives to "be out in front of the
curve" by being the first opposition voice to demand a commission of
inquiry.
In addition, there are political advantages for opposition parties
that choose to demand a commission of inquiry instead of appearing to
condemn prematurely the government for misfeasance. The opposition
4 9 Singley, supra note 36 at 323.
50 This is not to say the government ill not try to do o. Tvo days after the rcleaze of the ReFrt
of the Inquiry on the Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (the "McDonald
Commission"), the federal government released txuo legal opinions that disa.rced with s-verat of the
McDonald Commission's conclusionswith respect to %%hether criminal offenc s had been committed.
See Roach, supra note 43 at 279.
51C.R. Sunstein, "Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions" (1993) 06 Gco Li. 2267 at 2-76
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may appear to rise above mere partisanship by calling for an inquiry and
thereby creating "the appearance of neutrality and statesmanship.""2 A
demand for an inquiry may be buttressed by protestations that all the facts
are not yet known and that a commission is the only way to clear the air. In
such a situation, the opposition may ask, disingeniously perhaps, how a
commission could do any harm?
However, there are also disincentives at work. Most opposition
parties believe that they are only one election away from forming a
government. They realize, or ought to realize that "the act of appointing an
inquiry may then begin a process of self-reflection and self-criticism that
can exert influence long after the legal powers of the inquiry to compel
accounts has been exhausted."53 The appointment of a commission of
inquiry today may limit the policy flexibility of tomorrow's government.
This concern probably creates incentives for opposition parties to favour
inquiries that focus on historical fact-finding and the allocation of
responsibility in respect of alleged scandals. Similarly, there are
disincentives for opposition parties to call for commissions that focus on
structural or systemic problems within the state or that may make forward-
looking recommendations which may limit a future government's policy
flexibility. For example, the Liberal Party of Ontario's calls for a
commission of inquiry into circumstances surrounding the death of Mr.
George have focused primarily on the possibility of governmental
misconduct, and only secondarily on broader issues surrounding the
territorial rights of the Kettle and Stony Point First Nation.
4. Media Incentives
Finally, the media can play an important role in building public
support for the appointment of a commission of inquiry. They may call for
the appointment of a commission of inquiry directly through editorials 54 or
5 2 bid at 2276.
53 Roach, supra note 43 at 276.
5 4 See for example"Call Judicial Inquiry Now" Toronto Star (28 November 1998) B2 1hereinafter
"Call Judicial Inquiry Now"] (calling for an inquiry into alleged police misconduct in relation to
protesters at APEC summit in Vancouver). The Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP
released an interim report in August 2001 calling on the RCMP to "instill in its officers, particularly
those at senior levels who could be in contact in their professional work with senior representatives
of the government of Canada, that they are to brook no intrusion or interference whatever from
government officials as they meet the responsibilities of providing the agreed upon services": A.
Mcintosh, "Former aide to Chretien singled out" National Post (7 August 2001) at A7.
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by publicizing calls for a judicial inquiry by opposition parties"or
community groups.' 6 Editorially, many media outlets will find it "easy to
assume the posture of concerned outsider,57 and call for the appointment
of a commission of inquiry because "the nation deserves the truth."' s
However, there also edsts an economic incentive for commercial
media outlets to attract and retain readers, viewers and listeners. To the
extent that "corruption sells" there is an economic incentive to pay
attention to a "growing scandal or a call for the official investigation" of
government misfeasance.' As the pace of news distribution quickens with
the growth of internet news sources, allegations of government impropriety
may be subjected to less rigorous scrutiny than previouslyU Once
established, commissions of inquiry tend to produce new stories out of old
ones, providing grist for the publication mill. Commissions of inquiry also
make it easier for journalists to do their jobs; investigation is handed over
to an entity with the power of subpoena. Public disclosure of documents
and cross-examination of witnesses feeds the media's unfortunate
preoccupation with "gotcha"journalism. Moreover, live testimony enables
the media to focus more on "human interest dimensions of past tragedies
[and scandals] than [on] the strengths and weaknesses of alternative
institutional models for the future."t This tendency has the unfortunate
effect of focusing the public's attention on the naming and blaming
elements of a commission's work and away from its prospective policy
formation functions.
55 See, for example, J. Barker, -Liberals Urge Neo-Natal Care Faelitzc Pribc"Na-ma Pffot
(30 December 1993) B2; -More Setbacks n Neonatal Care" Teonto Star (30 December l 19T At
(Deputy Leader of Ontario Liberal Party calls for independent inquiry into !hortage of neonatal beds
in Toronto hospitals).
56 K. Hudson & C. Mallan, "Trillium Director Quit- in Disgust" Terento Star (31 Dcember
1993) At (Executive Director of Toronto charity Foodshare demands pubhe inqutqr into tiring of
Executive Director of Trillium Foundation).
5 7 Sunstein, supra note 51 at 2271.
58 Call Judicial Inquiry Now," supra note 54.
59 See generally the sources cited in Sunstem, supra note 51 at 2277
6 0 Sunstein,supra note 51 at 2270 (discussingscandal as a form of'ca' eode,"u here "peop!C tend
to believe that a scandal is important or real simply bccau- cther. behc'e, or appear to l Ie. that
it is important or real").
6 1 Trebilcock & Austin, supra note 1 at 51; Sunstem, supra note 51 at 22-7779,
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5. Summary
A government will be under an incentive to establish a commission
of inquiry where to do so results in the removal of an unpleasant
controversy from the political agenda or focuses on incidents that occurred
during the tenure of a previous government. The potential for vindication
in the face of allegations of governmental wrongdoing also creates an
incentive to establish a commission of inquiry. In addition, a government
may want to establish a commission of inquiry to delay or avoid decisions
in controversial or politically unpopular areas of public policy, or to prepare
public opinion for changes in public policy where such a change is otherwise
unlikely. The disincentives governments face when deciding to establish a
commission of inquiry-disincentives associated with the inability to
control the duration and cost of an inquiry, the inability to shape public
opinion in relation to the matters under investigation, and the risks of
political embarrassment and findings of governmental wrongdoing-all
stem from the fact that a government is relatively incapable of controlling
the process and outcome of a commission of inquiry. Opposition parties
and the media all face strong incentives to call for commissions of inquiry
but, for different reasons, these players tend to focus on exposing possible
governmental wrongdoing at the expense of broader systemic issues. To the
extent that the commission of inquiry is an institutional mechanism for the
formulation of public policy, its statutory framework produces a set of
inappropriate incentives and disincentives on political players to
contemplate, and to resist, the establishment of a commission of inquiry.
III. SHUT DOWN PROBLEMS
The Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian
forces to Somalia was established in 1995 to investigate aspects of the
deployment of Canadian peacekeeping forces to Somalia.62 Part of the
impetus behind the creation of the Somalia inquiry was the torture and
killing of Shidane Arone, a young Somali man, by members of the
Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia.63 The commissioners6 were
62 Established by Order in Council P.C. 1995-442,20 March 1995 [hereinafter Commission].
63 M.L. Friedland, "Military Justice and the Somalia Affair" (1998) 40 Crim. L.Q. 360 at 360.
64 The Honourable Gilles Letourneau, a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal, was appointed
Commission Chair. The other commissioners were Peter Desbarats, former Dean of the Western
School of Journalism, and the Honourable Robert Campbell Rutherford of the Ontario Court of
Justice (General Division).
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appointed to inquire into and report on the chain of command system,
leadership within the chain of command, discipline, operations, actions, and
decisions of the Canadian forces, and the actions and decisions of the
Department of National Defence in respect of the Canadian forces
deployment to Somalia. The commissioners were also directed to inquire
into nineteen specific issues relating to the pre-deployment period, the in-
theatre period and the post-deployment period. This mandate would later
be described as one of "extraordinary scale.""5
The Commission was given nine months to complete its work and
was directed to file its report no later than 22 December 1995 !5 A little
over two months into the mandate, the commissioners realized the report
date was unrealistic and applied to the Privy Council Office for an
extension of the deadline until 20 September 1996.67 In response, the
Governor in Council extended the deadline to 28 June 1996.P On 6 March
1996, the commissioners requested a second extension, until 31 March
1997, citing the development of new and unanticipated issues, the high
volume of documents filed with the Commission, and the difficulty in
obtaining disclosure of essential documents from the Department of
Defence.69 This request was eventually granted on 20 June 1996. 0 In
November of 1996, the Commission requested a third extension to
December 1997. But on 10 January 1996, as the Commission began to
investigate the roles and responsibilities of high-ranking government
officials in a possible cover up of the Arone murder, the Privy Council
Office issued a final ultimatum to the commissioners: "Although all
scenarios proposed in your workplan were examined, given the
Government's desire to pursue solutions as quickly as possible, it was not
regarded as being in the national interest to have to wait at least another
year to receive the Commission's input."'7 The letter further stated that the
commission was to complete its work and file its report by 30 June 19977
65 Dixon v. Canada (1997), 146 D.LR. (4th) 156 at 161 (F.CT.D.) [hereinafter Dixon (ToD.)].
66Order in Council P.C. 1995-442.
6 7 Letter dated 2June 1995 to Jocelyne Bourgon, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the
Cabinet. See Dixon (T.D.), supra note 65 at 170.
Order in Council P.C. 1995-1273,26 July 1995.
69 Letter dated 6 March 1996 to Jocelyne Bourgon, Clerk of the Prny Council and Secretary to
the Cabinet. See Dixon (T.D.), supra note 65 at 170.
70Order in Council P.C. 1996-959.
71Dixon (T.D.), supra note 65 at 172.
72 Later confirmed by Order in Council P.C. 1997-174,4 February 1994.
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A. Two Shut Down Techniques
The circumstances surrounding the completion of the Somalia
Inquiry illustrate a second set of problems associated with securing political
and governmental accountability through commissions of inquiry, namely,
those that arise from the fact that governments' possess the authority to
shut down or restrict a commission's activity in the middle of its mandate.
However independent a commission of inquiry may be, ultimately it is the
creature of government.
A government can exercise the authority to shut down a
commission in at least one of two ways. First, the terms of reference
creating a commission of inquiry usually contain a reporting deadline which
provides a direct method of controlling delay in reporting and an indirect
method of controlling the costs of the commission's work. An externally
imposed deadline may also have the effect of limiting the scope of the
inquiry's investigation. Commissions of inquiry have routinely obtained
extensions to complete their work from the government. 73 Until very
recently it was possible to state that reporting deadlines were "largely
meaningless" as governments never refused requests for extensions."
However, the federal government's actions in relation to the Somalia
Inquiry signal that it no longer feels bound by this convention. Indeed, at
least one provincial government has now begun to reserve expressly, in its
enabling legislation, the authority to "wind up" a commission of inquiry.7
Second, the preliminary budget of a commission of inquiry is
established by the commission with assistance from the Privy Council
Office or Cabinet Office. 76 While government officials will scrutinize
budgetary requests and questions of money are negotiated between the
commission and these officials, the assumption has been that a commission
For example, the Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada (the "Krevcr
Commission"), which began in October 1993, was originally to report within twelve months. Its final
report was, in fact, delivered in November 1997. See N. D'Ombrain,supra note3l at 94 and Trcbilcock
& Austin, supra note I at 20. Similarly, the Deschenes (four extensions), Baird (three extensions),
Moshansky (four extensions) and Somalia inquiries all received extensions of their original reporting
dates. See D'Ombrain, supra note 31 at note 15.
D'Ombrain, supra note 31 at 94.
75 See An Act to Establish and Validate the Public Inquiry Into the Administration of Justice and
AboriginalPeople, S.M. 1989-90, c., s. 1: "[tlhe Lieutenant Governor in Council may ... wind up the
commission."
76 D'Ombrain, supra note 31 at 94.
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will receive resources that it feels are necessary to complete its task."'
Indeed, it has been suggested that "[a]t all times the financing of the
inquiry must be solely within the authority and discretion of the
commissioners [because] [t]o do otherwise would be to permit budgetary
controls to fetter the inquiry's independence and affect its ability to fulfill
its mandate."7"
But this assumption may no longer be valid in light of the federal
government's actions in relation to the Somalia Inquiry. One of the reasons
the Somalia Inquiry gave for needing additional time was the difficulty in
obtaining timely disclosure of key documents from the Department of
National Defence. There is little difference between withholding funding,
which governments have yet to do, and refusing to extend a reporting
deadline, which, in light of the fate of the Somalia Inquiry, the federal
government appears willing to do. The federal government's willingness to
do the latter may signal a willingness to do the former. Either action
compromises the capacity of a commission of inquiry to secure political and
governmental accountability.
B. The Legality of Shutdowns
The legality of the federal government's decision not to extend the
Somalia inquiry's reporting deadline was challenged in Divon v. Canada.
John Dixon, a former advisor to then Minister of Defence Kim Campbell,
was scheduled to be a Commission witness. However, after certain
Commission documents were released to the public, a Canadian Presswire-
service story suggested that Dixon and others may have been involved in a
cover-up. On 4 January 1997, Dixon applied to the Commission to be
granted full standing in order to clarify vho in the Minister's office 'knew
what, and when' in respect of the killing of Arone. The Commission refused
his request because "its mandate had been 'truncated' by the government's
decision to end the hearings on or about 31 March 1997 and it would be
unable to investigate the role and responsibilities of high-ranling
77 Desbarats, supra note 35 at 2-53.
78Ri. Anthony & A.R. Lucas, A Handbook on the Conduct of Pablth Inquiries in Canada
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1935) at 42.
79 Dixon v. Canada (1997), 146 D.LR. (4th) 156 (F.C.T.D.), rev'd 119971149 D.LR, (4th) 269
(FC.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, S January 1993, $.CC Bulletin, 1993 at 23.
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government officials, including.. .whether there was a cover-up of the
Arone murder."80
Dixon applied to the Federal Court for relief. Justice Simpson
allowed Dixon's application for judicial review. She stated the following:
The Governor in Council takes the view that it is entitled to treat the Commission of Inquiry
like a government department which can be created, directed and disbanded as the
Governor in Council sees fit. There is no question that the Governor in Council can create
a commission of inquiry, establish the mandate and appoint the commissioners. It can also
set reasonable target dates and terminate a commission of inquiry in a lawful manner.
However, in my view, at a minimum, a commission of inquiry is independent when its
decisions relate to the manner in which it will carry out its mandate. I am also satisfied that
this independence must mean that it is for the Commissioners, in a situation such as this
where they are compelled to investigate and report, to decide when they have heard or
otherwise received sufficient evidence to enable them to make the findings of fact necessary
to support conclusions in their report. In my view, the Governor in Council is not entitled
to decide when the Commissioners have received sufficient evidence."'
Justice Simpson held the Order in Council requiring the
Commission to complete its report by 30 June 1997 to be ultra vires. In her
opinion, the Order in Council breached the rule of law by not respecting
the Commission's independence and by requiring the impossible of the
commissioners. In her view, the commissioners ought to have been entitled
to determine how to carry out their mandate and the point at which their
investigation was sufficient to support findings in their report.82 She
suggested that the Governor in Council issue an Order in Council imposing
final deadlines that would allow the inquiry the time it reasonably requires
to complete its original mandate or an Order in Council that eliminates
specified matters from the inquiry's mandate.
The Federal Court of Appeal, however, allowed Canada's appeal,
quashed the orders and declarations made by the trial judge, and declared
that the impugned Order in Council was intra vires the Governor in
Council.83 Justice Marceau recognized the importance of the independence
of commissions of inquiry, but refused to accept that they could operate
except within the confines established by the Governor in Council:
It has often been suggested, expressly or impliedly, especially in the media but also
elsewhere, that commissions of inquiry were meant to operate and act as fully independent
soIbid. at 160.
81 Ibid at 178.
82 Ibid. at 179.
8 3 Dixon v. Canada (1997), 149 D.L.R. (4th) 269 at 28I(F.C.A.), [hereinafter Dixon (C.A.)].
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adjudicative bodies, akin to the Judiciary and completely separate and apart from the
Executhe by whom they were created. This is a completely misleading su gcstton, in my
view. The idea of an investigative body, entirely autonomous, armed vth all of the p5"ers
and authority necessary to uncover the truth and answerable to no one, may vell be
contemplated, if one is prepared to disregard the ri ks to individuals and the particularities
of the Canadian context. But a commission under -ection I of the Inquiries Act is simply
not such a body. It is easy to realize nowadays the tremendous impact that commi:ons of
inquiry, as they now exist, may hate on Canadian society, but, in my view, their public
importance is not and cannot be the source of a tpccial legal status. No one dtsp ates the
necessity ofpresenring the independence of commissions of mrquiy as to the manner m t hrrh
they may exercise their powers, conduct their mvestigatians, onjanne thicr dch&-rations and
prepare their reports. The role they play in our democracy has become much too vital to
accept that the manner in which they investigate matters and formulate the conclusions and
recommendations that they arrive at, can be freely tamered with or influenced by an)one
vwthin or outside the gox ernment of The day, and that applies to ank, comm,-ion, whether
or not its investigations relate to the conduct of goernmient offiials. And the fact is, in any
event, that the Act itself provides for such investigative and advisory ind endence by
explicitly setting out the nature, the general role and the basic Fawr;ers of commis ons of
inquiry, even if it does so rather succinctly.AU this, ho..eer, does nvt alter, in any i --a, the
basic truth that commissions of inquiy owe their existence to the Eccuta . As aqencts of the
Executive, I do not see ho-, they can operate othen- zse than ivithin the paramers estab isdcd
Iy the Govemor in CouncilO
Justice Marceau found that courts, unlike commissions of inquiry,
have a duty to arrive at a definitive conclusion. Commissions of inquiry, he
concluded, have only an obligation to report on what they have found:
The role of the Commissioners is not to decide issues definitively and their report is not
intended to pronounce judgment, but merely to cxplam the result- of their work and the
opinions (in terms of conclusions and rccommendations) which they , ere able to form
given the time and resources available to them; no more, no less, The independence of the
Commissioners as to the evaluation of the evidence and the po sibilty for them to expre:5
a view is in no way affected, and their ability to provide a complete and adequate reprt, in
this sense, is indisputable. Again, the right of the Commissioners to decide , hen they have
sufficient evidence to make a particular conclusion or rccommendattan is certainly not
jeopardized by the Governor in Council exercising the right he alone has to decide , hen it
is time to call for the Commission's report and advice'
Justice Marceau concluded that while "it may well be" that the
government's decision to terminate the work of the Commission was
"motivated by political expediency," such a concern was "simply not the
business of the Court.' ' "
84 Ibid at 277-78 [emphasis added].
85 Ibid. at 280.
86 Ibid at 279.-It is a well-established principle of law and a fundamental tenet of our sytem of
government, in which Parliament and not the Judiciary is supreme, that the courts have no rza;'.cr to
review the policy considerations which motivate Cabinet dccisions."
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The decision of the Federal Court of Appeal suggests that the
judiciary is indifferent to the motives underlying a Cabinet decision to
refuse to extend a deadline for the work of a commission of inquiry. The
decision did not strictly decide whether the government could step in and
shut down a commission of inquiry in advance of the commission's
deadline. Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Appeal's decision certainly
undermines the conventional wisdom that deadlines imposed on
commissions of inquiry are largely meaningless. 7
IV. OTHER APPROACHES
Both sets of problems canvassed in Parts II and III seriously
hamper the capacity of the commission of inquiry to serve as an effective
instrument for the formulation of public policy. As illustrated by
circumstances surrounding the death of Dudley George, the fact that the
decision to appoint a commission of inquiry lies within the sole authority
of the federal or provincial cabinet enables governments, for purely
partisan reasons, to refuse to establish commissions of inquiry into matters
that clearly merit independent investigation. As illustrated by circumstances
surrounding the Somalia inquiry, the fact that commissions of inquiry, once
established, ultimately remain creatures of government may impair their
ability to engage in a full investigation of the matter at hand. This Part
examines whether there is anything useful to be learned about structuring
inquiries, from two American institutional alternatives, namely, the
Independent Counsel model and the Inspector General model.
A. The Independent Counsel Model
1. Impetus for Change
Following the Watergate scandal and, in particular, the "Saturday
Night Massacre" (the firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
by acting Attorney General Robert Bork),8s Congress enacted the Ethics in
87
One of the Commissioners has characterized the decision in more dramatic terms: see
Desbarats,supra note 35 at 257. The decision "demolishes the independence of public inquiries under
law... [and] has opened the way for unrestricted government interference with public inquiries".
88 S. Dash, "Independent Counsel: No More, No Less a Federal Prosecutor" (1998) 86 Geo. L.J.
2077: "Cox had refused to obey Nixon's directive to cease his aggressive efforts to obtain the White
House Tapes that were alleged to have recorded a criminal conspiracy to cover up the White House
sponsored burglary of DNC headquarters in the Watergate."
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Government Act of 19 78.9 Congress was attempting to achieve several
policy goals. First, Congress sought to reassure the public that certain
politically powerful individuals would not receive preferential treatment in
criminal investigations and prosecutions!" Second, it sought to eliminate
any appearance of a conflict of interest on the part of attorneys general by
sharply limiting their ability to control or prevent the criminal investigation
of their colleagues.91 Third, it attempted to ensure the impartiality of the
investigation by placing the appointment of the independent counsel in the
hands of judges.
2. The Obligations of the Attorney General
Prior to its expiry in June 1999,9- the Act set out a rigid procedure
to handle complaints that government officials have violated the law. The
procedure required the attorney general to conduct a preliminary
investigation "whenever the Attorney General receives information
sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate" whether any covered person
may have violated federal criminal law. For the purposes of the Act, a
covered person included, inter alia, the president and vice-president, the
attorney general, and assistant attorney general. The only factors which
were considered by the attorney general when determining whether a
preliminary investigation was warranted were the specificity of the
information received and the credibility of the source of the information.
The attorney general had thirty days to decide whether or not a preliminary
investigation was warranted.93
If a preliminary investigation was warranted, the attorney general
had ninety days before being required to report to the U.S. Court of
Appeals (D.C. Circuit), Special Division for Appointing Independent
Counsels (hereinafter Special Division). During this time, the attorney
general did not have the power to convene grand juries, plea bargain, grant
69 Pub. L No. 95-521.92 Stat. 1,67 [hereinafterAct]. TheAct was recnacled three timcs and
the last version was at 28 U.S.C. §§591,599 (1996).
90 j. O'Sullivan, -The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Poho" (1996l 33 Ain Cam,
LR. 463 at 463.
91 K.J. Harriger, "Damned if She Does and Damned if She Doezn't: The Attorney General and
the Independent Counsel Statute" (1993) 86 Georgetown L. 2697 at 2101
92 Follo-ving Prosecutor Kenneth Starr's confrontationsvith Prez dent Clinton, the.4ct expired
and was not renewed. The attorney general now has zole responsbility for appontmg outziide
prosecutors.
93 Act, supra note 89, § 591,
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immunity, or issue subpoenas. The attorney general could not decline to
proceed because the target of the investigation lacked the mens rea for the
alleged offence unless there was "clear and convincing evidence" of that
fact. At the conclusion of the ninety day preliminary investigation, the
legislation provided that if "there are no reasonable grounds to conclude
that further investigation is warranted," the attorney general was to notify
the court of the attorney general's conclusion. This brought the matter to
a close; if the attorney general decided not to proceed the Act stated that
"the Court shall have no power to appoint an independent counsel with
respect to the matters involved."'94
3. Appointment of the Independent Counsel
If the attorney general concluded that there were reasonable
grounds to believe that further investigation was warranted, then the
attorney general was required to apply to the Special Division (to be
comprised of three senior or retired circuit judges appointed by the Chief
Justice of the United States) for the appointment of an independent
counsel. The attorney general's decision to apply or not to apply for the
appointment of an independent counsel was not subject to judicial review.95
The Special Division had both the authority to appoint the
independent counsel and to define the counsel's prosecutorialjurisdiction.96
There were no special qualifications required of the independent counsel
except that they have "appropriate experience" and should be able to
conduct the investigation and any prosecution in a prompt, responsible, and
cost-effective manner. The scope of the prosecutorial discretion to be
conferred was broad. The legislation provided that the Special Division
"shall assure that the independent counsel has adequate authority to fully
investigate the subject matter ... all matters related to that subject matter
:.. [and] Federal crimes ... that may arise out of the investigation ...
including perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and
intimidation of witnesses., 97
94 Ibid.§ 592. See alsoMorrison v. Olson (1988) 487 U.S. 654 at 695 (hereinafter Morrisoni. "We
note nonetheless that under the Act the Special Division has no power to appoint an independent
counsel sua sponte; it may only do so upon the specific request of the Attorney General.".
95 Ibid.§ 592(c) and (f). See also Morrison, ibid. at 695 "...the courts are specifically prevented
from reviewing the Attorney General's decision not to seek appointment"; and cases referred to in
O'Sullivan, supra note 90 at n. 14.
96 Ibid.§ 593(b)(1).
9 7 Ibid., § 593(3).
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Although the independent counsel was subject to congressional
oversight and was required to report to Congress, the independence of the
independent counsel was virtually absolute. The independent counsel was
granted significant independent authority, including all investigative and
prosecutorial functions and powers of the attorney general and the
Department of Justice. The independent counsel had a "virtually
unlimited budget," as the Department of Justice was required to "... pay all
costs relating to the establishment and operation of any office of
independent counsel."" There was no time limit set for an independent
counsel's investigation and no time limit on the appointment of a particular
counsel. The independent counsel could only be removed from office in
two ways: if the independent counsel was impeached and convicted or by
the attorney general only for good cause,' physical disability, mental
incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impaired the
performance of such independent counsel's duties."" Otherwise, an office
of independent counsel was to terminate only w-hen the independent
counsel notified the attorney general that the investigation was complete,
or was so substantially complete that it would be appropriate for the
Department of Justice to complete such investigations and prosecutions,
and file a final report." '2
4. Evaluating the Independent CounselAct
The Independent CounselAct provides one method of dealing with
"start-up" and "shut-down" problems that plague the Canadian institution
of the commission of inquiry. The Act was designed to curtail severely the
discretion of the attorney general. It set out a broad list of "covered
9 Ibid, § 594.
99 O'Sullhan,supra note 90 at 467. But see Dash,supra note n at 233. The 1994 Act impa:ed
fiscal controls "as tight- and in some respects tighter- as thoese impos d on the Justice Department7.
100 J. p. Fleissner, "The Future of the Independent Counsel Statute: Confronting the Dilemma
of Allocating the Power of Prosecutorial Discretion" (1993) 49 Mercer L Rev 427 at 435. The
likelihood of an Attorney General choosing to sack an independent counzel for "good cause" v~a
reduced, if not eliminated by the memory of Archibald CoN and the Saturday Night Massacre
ICA, supra note S9. § 596(a)(1). An Attorney General seeking to remo o an Indcpandent
Counselwas required to a report speciging the facts found and the ultimate ground-, for such remni.al
to the Special Division and Congressvhovvere to make this information publiclyavailable- § $961a)%2
The action of the Attorney General was subject to judical re,.xw at the request of the remx.ed
Independent Counsel. Reinstatement was an avalable rcmcy, § 596(a)131.
102 Ibid., § 596(b)(1). The Special Division was also authorized to terminate theoffice on itsoxn
motion, or at the request of the Attorney General if the same test v as met § 59tb)(2).
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persons" and required the attorney general to refer cases for appointment
if the case met a relatively low standard.0 3 Such an appointment could only
be avoided where there was a preliminary determination that the charges
were not sufficiently credible or specific, or where the attorney general
believed there to be no reasonable grounds to believe that further
investigation was warranted. However, as we have seen above, there are
very strong incentives for both the media and opposition politicians to
make and repeat allegations of alleged government impropriety. There is
no doubt that demands for an independent counsel became "political
weapons" in partisan skirmishes in Washington.
Demands for an Independent Counsel have become political weapons because they not only
ensure that allegations of wrongdoing by political allies of the president receive maximum
and continuing political press coverage, they also put the administration in a political bind.
A refusal to refer the allegations to the Special Division will be good for yet more adverse
publicity, and may actually result in a greater political black eye than would a referral and
subsequent investigation. One could argue that an Attorney General may, particularly in
light of the Whitewater experience, determine that taking a short-term penalty in very high
profile cases may be better than inviting a political haemorrhage. In the more ordinary case,
however, it seems likely that an Attorney General faced with allegations of wrongdoing by
administration officials.. .may feel pressured to over-refer in order to counter any
perception she is obstructing justice."
The politics of scandal has been identified as one of "the most
significant phenomena of our time."'" As media and partisan political
interest in a case grew, it became increasingly difficult for an attorney
general to avoid a preliminary inquiry by claiming the allegations were not
specific or credible.1c6 Moreover, the attorney general may have found it
difficult to conclude that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that
further investigation was warranted without being able to rely on standard
investigative techniques of issuing subpoenas or the ability to use a grand
jury. 07
103 It should be noted that the original version of the Act provided the Attorney General with
even less discretion to appoint an independent counsel. The original statute amounted to a "hair-
trigger" and was severely criticized and amended: K.J. Harriger, "The History of the Independent
Counsel Provisions: How the Past Informs the Current Debate" (1998) 49 Mercer L. Rev. 489 at 506,
104 O'Sullivan, supra note 90 at 479.
105 See generally S. Garment, Scandal: The Crisis of Mistrust in American Politics (New York:
Times Books, 1991).
106 Sunstein, supra note 51 at 2273.
107 O'Sullivan, supra note 90 at 479.
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It should be noted that while the Act limited the discretion of the
attorney general to seek the appointment of an independent counsel, this
process was triggered by a very narrow class of allegations against a
relatively broad-arguably too broad-list of office holders. While this
approach would control one start up problem facing Canadian commissions
of inquiry by fettering the otherwise non-justiciable discretion of Cabinet
to establish a commission of inquiry, it would do so only on very narrow
grounds. If Canada had a mechanism similar to theAct it seems unlikely,
for example, that an independent counsel would be appointed in theAsia
Pacific Economic CooperationO controversy. Would an independent
counsel be appointed to inquire into the death of Mr. George? If it were,
the inquiry would be narrowly focused on whether or not the premier or
another covered person violated the Criminal Code. This focus would miss
many of the important policy and accountability issues that should properly
be the subject of a commission of inquiry.
Another problem with the Independent Counsel model is that the
very elements that guaranteed the independence of the independent
counsel and avoided "shut-dovm problems" create unintended negative
consequences. First, the virtually unlimited budget ensured that there vere
no institutional incentives to keep costs dovwn.1 ' Second, each independent
counsel assembled their entire office from scratch following their
appointment. They hired their own staff, leased space, rented computers,
installed phone lines and developed their entire infrastructure. The start-up
costs of each independent counsel investigation were not insignificant,
provided very little value to the investigation, and could not be amortized
over subsequent investigations. This approach created additional
inefficiencies, as there was no institutional or collective memory in place to
promote best practices that could improve results and reduce time and
expenses. In both these respects, the Independent Counsel model
duplicates problems inherent in the Canadian model of commissions of
inquiry.
It is true that the lack of a time limit on the investigation ensured
that a Congress allied to the executive member under investigation could
not limit the scope of the independent counsel's work. When compared to
a similar investigation conducted by the Department of Justice, however,
10q. Pue, "The Prime Minister's Police, Cvmmr goner Huvhe,' APEC Repor" (21) 39
Osgoode Hall L. 165. See also, W. Pue, ed., Peppcr m Our Eu's: The PFC4.jfftr tVanc-3mr-
University of British Columbia Press, 2000).
109 M.R. Brornich, "Running Spzcial In cstigation-, The ln147-39r General MeJeF' 61 9C) L
Georgetown LJ. 2027.
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the lack of controls on the independent counsel led to vastly
disproportionate resources in time and money being expended., "
Independent counsels were drawn from the private bar for a one-off
assignment. The pool of candidates became dominated by "ambitious
individuals who view their appointment as independent counsels as a
springboard to recognition, prestige and career enhancement ... [they] view
their roles not as fact-finders to determine a balance of justice but as
prosecutors out to convict prominent figures.""' This led to overzealous
prosecutions where targets of the independent counsel became the
prosecutorial equivalent of "big-horn sheep": trophies to be bagged at all
costs." 2 It was not easy for an independent counsel to explain a failure to
prosecute, and the same political figures that demanded a prosecution
criticized as incompetent an independent counsel who did not pursue a
prosecution." 3
Perhaps the element of the Independent Counsel model that is
most problematic for ensuring political and governmental accountability is
the way in which it criminalizes policy differences between politicians.
Attempts to promote accountability through criminal investigations
unnecessarily limits the scope of the inquiry. Aside from the very clear
division of powers issues raised by such an approach," 4 it requires a focus
on whether crimes have been committed. But the purpose of a criminal
investigation is not to tell a story, evaluate policy, or promote systemic
reform, it is to determine whether an individual has committed a criminal
offence and, if so, to attach criminal liability. Except insofar as it attempts
to ascertain facts specifically relevant to criminal liability, a criminal
investigation is "a very blunt and imperfect instrument for explaining to the
public what happened in a series of transactions and sequence of events."' "
It is even less suited to formulating policy that seeks to ensure that such
events do not occur in the future. Any institutional arrangement
authorizing the establishment of commissions of inquiry should be careful
not to deflect attention away from such substantive issues by turning
110 P.B. Heymann, "Four Unresolved Questions About the Responsibilities of an Independent
Counsel" (1998) 86 Georgetown L.J. 2119 at 2121; see also M.F. Schultz, "Attorney's Fees Under the
ICA: How the Grinch Stole Lyn Nofziger's Wallet" (1992) 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1311.
IIIN.J. Ornstein, "Doing Congress's Dirty Work" (1998) 86 Georgetown L.J. 2179 at 2192,
112 Ibid. at 2189.
113 Heymann, supra note 110 at 2129.
114 Consider, for example, Starr v. Houlden, supra note 34.
115 Bromwich, supra note 109 at 2042.
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disputes about policy into allegations of criminality. A commission of
inquiry's ultimate relevance does not lie in its ability to ascertain whether
or not a politician or police officer may have engaged in activity that
violated the Criminal Code."" It lies instead in assessing the actual effects
of policies on people's lives." 7 Reliance on criminal sanctions to ensure
governmental and political accountability seems misplaced.
B. The Inspector General Model
Congress enacted the Inspector General Actt 4 in 1978, the same
year as the Independent Counsel Act, authorizing the creation of offices
"whose mission was to detect and prevent fraud, waste and abuse" in
government departments, including the Departments of Treasury and
Justice," 9 and in the executive branch of government.*' Inspectors general
initially were concerned with audit functions and the prevention of fraud
and abuse. They were described as the "newest component in the
government's fight against white-collar crime. " 2' However, inspectors
general increasingly have been called on to deal with a broader array of
misconduct. Offices of Inspector General (01G) present a starkly different
model of ensuring accountability from the institution of the independent
counsel:
Like independent counsel, Otos have the responcbtty forcondutngtpeal i t esgsrt
of broad pubicinterest and importance. But unlike independent counsels, utd Nt eCa\
forthe sole purpose ofconductingasingle spealnwestgaton.nor 
€%en-gsn thetradt,
inspection, and program cuauatton functnow,-just to conduct a csttytn. UIG are
permanent institutions, hae a perin at the head of the institution who is pohtwlall)
accountable, are subject to meaningful congre,,tu onal o, eight and, through the butlsatar
116 R.S.C. 1985, c C-46.
117 Sunstein, supra note 5I at 2271 "The central qucstion for .- go;snment, almost all of the
time, is not whether some official has acted improperky, but whether current paoheis are maing I th t
better or worse, and how they might be improved2
121! Inspector GeneratAct of1 976.,5 U.S.C app. [lheriafter 10 1.
119 Inspector General Act Amendments, s. Wt2loc,cedifted a, amcnded at. U S C app 3 § I-
1Z0 Brom ich,supra note 1(9 at 2027. One of the fc, cx"utae branch instituttons-athout an
inspector general is the White House. See K. Clark, "Tow-.ard Mere Ethical Goernmcni An
Inspector General for the White House" (199S) 49 Mercer L Rev. 553 at %1 (Clinton white How
has resisted congressional efforts to impose an inspctor gcneral 1
121MJ. Gates& M.F. Knoiles,'The lnspectvrGne ial Act in the FcderalGoncmrcnt A'Ce-
Approach to Accountability" (1985) 36 Alta L Rev. 473 at SIU KV, Muellencrg & HJ Volzer,
"Inspector General Act of 1973r (190) 53 Temple L Q 11,41.
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appropriations process, have real limits on the resources they can allocate to any specific
investigation
22
The fundamental purpose of a special investigation of an inspector
general is not to lead to criminal prosecutions. Instead, it is to determine
what happened and why. One inspector general has convincingly argued
that "this explanatory purpose may, in many cases, rival, or even exceed, the
imperative to hold individuals accountable, either through the criminal
process or through administrative discipline.""z Inspectors general are well
positioned to make recommendations for improved government operations
and "can provide an invaluable aid to good government and prevent future
scandals."' 24
1. The Appointment Process and the Selection and Referral
of Investigations
According to theAct, inspectors general "shall be appointed by the
president, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, without regard
to political affiliation and solely on the basis of demonstrated ability in
accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration or investigations.""
The inspector general is appointed for an indefinite term of office,
which assures some measure of independence from the appointing
executive. While the president (who must provide reasons to Congress)
may remove an inspector general from office, inspectors general commonly
have enjoyed tenure beyond that of the appointing president.26 The process
of presidential appointment followed by Senate confirmation is different
from that of an independent counsel (and a commissioner of an inquiry in
Canada). The process of appointing an inspector general guarantees a level
of scrutiny and political accountability in excess of that surrounding the
appointment of an independent counsel.
122 Bromwich, supra note 109 at 2028.
1 2 3 Ibid at 2043. This is an unnecessarily narrow approach to accountability. There is no reason
that a compelling and factual narrative surrounding a tragedy or government misconduct, accompanied
by recommendations to ensure that such events never again occur, is not a form of accountability. See
generally, Roach, supra note 43.
124 Clark, supra note 120 at 563.
125 IGA, supra note 118, § 3(a).
126 Bromwich, supra note 109 at 2029.
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TheAct provides inspectors general with a very broad mandate to
conduct and supervise investigations relating to programs and operations
within their jurisdiction. Except where investigations could pose threats to
ongoing criminal investigations or matters of national security, inspectors
general may investigate any matter and gather any necessary evidence
during the course of their investigation. Investigations can be triggered by
requests from senior management within the department, members of
Congress, or may be initiated by the inspector general on the basis of their
ongoing work or media reports.1' The test for determining the
appropriateness of an investigation is the "apparent legitimacy of the
allegations and the seriousness of the issues raised by the request."'12 A
mere request for an investigation, regardless of the source, is insufficient to
trigger an investigation if the matter does not warrant the expenditure of
investigative resources. Since the oIG has a finite budget that must cover
special investigations as well as a myriad of other ongoing activities, the oIG
is required to carefully marshal its resources. These budgetary constraints
create an institutional requirement to filter requests for investigation and
provide incentives to allocate sufficient resources to an investigation
without over-reaching the budget. These structural incentives are largely
absent in both the American Independent Counsel and Canadian
commission of inquiry models.
Moreover, the inspectorgeneral determines the scope of the inquiry
and may enlarge its inquiry as it sees fit. Again, this is quite different from
the mandate of the independent counsel (which wvas set by the Special
Division) and the mandate of a Canadian commission of inquiry
(established by terms of reference set by Cabinet). This institutional
freedom permits an inspector general to conduct an investigation that may
be different in scope than what was envisioned by the referring agent. This
freedom is an important safeguard of independence; it helps to ensure that
the work and integrity of the inspector general is not compromised by
"management's view of the investigation as a form of damage control.' u
When an OIG launches a special investigation, it is staffed primarily
with existing resources. The OIG within the Department of Justice, for
example, has a Special Investigations and Review Unit which consists of
prosecutors, investigators (vth Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Immigration and Naturalization Service and Drug Enforcement
127 Ib at 2032.
12 lbid at 2033.
129 Ibid at 2032
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Administration experience), and infrastructure staff. The importance of
organizational continuity has been recognized by the inspector general of
the United States Department of Justice:
Each additional investigation we conduct increases our experience and organizational
knowledge as well as the efficiency of future investigations. These include simple but
important tasks, such as developing a system of collecting, logging and preserving evidence,
developing protocols for conducting interviews, including the circumstances under which
interviews are recorded; establishing routines for supervising pending investigations; and
developing the format for presenting special investigative reports. All of these aspects of
conducting special investigations improve with the valuable insightsgained from each matter
we undertake."3
Specialized investigators and experienced prosecutors, selected for
their investigative experience and writing ability, supplement this core staff
as required by the investigation in question.
2. Investigative Tools
The ultimate goal of an inspector general investigation is to
determine what happened rather than to bring criminal prosecutions.t3" '
But, subject to several exceptions, an OIG may rely on the investigative tools
normally available to criminal and regulatory investigations. First,
inspectors general have the statutory authority to obtain any and all records
from any component of their agency without a subpoena. The inspector
general has no authority to subpoena records from other federal agencies,
but such records may be made available cooperatively.t32 Second, inspectors
general may use an administrative subpoena duces tecum to obtain
documents and other evidence from individuals and entities other than
federal agencies.133 Third, inspectors general have "plenary authority" to
interview employees including the ability to request the employer to direct
the witness to attend for interview. Any statements given by an employee
cannot be used against them in any future criminal proceedings and failure
to follow an order to appear can result in the imposition of employment-
related sanctions up to and including termination of employment.t 34
130 Ibid. at 2038.
131In fact, the investigations of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice have never
resulted in criminal prosecution. Ibid. at 2037.
132 Muellenberg & Volzer, supra note 121 at 1058-1066.
13 3 IGA, supra note 118, § 6(a)(3).
Bromwich, supra note 109 at 2036.
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However, there is no statutory authority for the inspector general to obtain
testimonial subpoenas.31
3. Cost Constraints and Legislative Oversight
In any investigation, whether by an inspector general, an
independent counsel, or commission of inquiry1 there is political pressure
to report promptly. There has been widespread criticism of the duration of
a number of American independent counsel investigations, including the
Walsh inquiry into the Iran-Contra affair and the Starr inquiry, as, well as
a number of Canadian commissions of inquiry, including the Somalia and
Krever Inquiries. Bromwich believes that the duration and cost ofinspector
general investigations compare favourably to those of the independent
counsel. 6 In addition to the institutional incentives to keep costs dovwn, he
has identified the factors which he believes accounts for the relative speed
and efficiency of the inquiry:
odi's institutional infrastructure, vhich does not hawe to be created from cratch for each
new im estigation; our commitment to staffing thc e mattcrs adtquatclh, the camintmant
of theindiidualsassigned tothese matters tocomplete them rather thin departingt.fore
the work is done ... ; and the established and know.n methods k, u-hIch %e prepare, rcuizv.
and publish our reports."
Since the OG exists apart and beyond the scope of any particular
investigation, it has an ongoing relationship vth the legislature and
congressional committees. The appropriations committee has direct control
over the size of the global budget that the oIG has to work with. Since all
special investigations are funded out of the GIG'S global budget, there is
indirect congressional oversight of the level of public resources directed
toward specific inspector general investigations. Bromwich comments that
he has:
not found that congressional oversight hinder; or imyedes our : .. zetA antetrgatenz. but
we must be prepared to explain and dfend the conduct of eur qrzesal intz.tigita;,
135IGA, supra note I 1, § 6(a)(4). This Estuation has been crittcwd in R C MX an,
"Procurement Fraud Imestigatn Tcchniques The Nc;J for Congr, tonal EpAn::on of the
Inspector General Subpoena Powr to Include the Po wr to C'omrel T.tn w.' ( l371 14 Publ,
Contract LJ. 470 at 501-510.
756 Brotmich, supra note 109 at 204041. Fae mn.or Insuector General int atton rearwe
completed in twenty-sL months at a cost of S1S mllon, ertht months and 5StciiJ elewn months
and $1.0 million; eighteen months and $1.5 million; and, fifteen mvnths and $7!i uA. re:rzctJ|
13 7Thd at 2039.
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including both the substantive conclusions we reach as well as the duration and cost of such
investigations. Although there is always the risk that our special investigations may tap into
political agendas and may spur efforts to manipulate what we investigate, this simply
underscores the need for OtGs to exercise theirown independent and professional judgment
in deciding what matters to investigate and what quantity of resources to allocate to
particular special investigations.'"
These budgetary controls could severely undermine the
independence of the OIG and the level of political and governmental
accountability it can foster. However, they also create institutional
incentives to ensure efficient investigations, and provide democratic
accountability as well as congressional oversight.
4. Summary
The Inspector General model presents a novel approach to securing
political and governmental accountability. It has several features which
promote independence from its congressional superiors. An office's
independent ability to commence investigations, controls for some of the
disincentives governments face when considering appointing a commission
of inquiry. Providing the matter rises to the level of importance sufficient
to warrant the allocation of resources, the 0IG is also prepared to conduct
an investigation at the request of the Congress. The fact that the 01G may
define the terms of reference for its special investigations helps to ensure
that its investigation does not become mere damage control for top
management or a partisan wild-goose chase. The fact that the OIG operates
on a fixed budget provides institutional incentives to work effectively and
efficiently toward a resolution. However, congressional oversight of the 01G
budget could lead to an attenuated shut-down problem if the work of the
0IG did not meet with the appropriation committee's favour. On the other
hand, this legislative oversight provides the OIG with a measure of political
accountability and credibility which may be lacking from independent
counsel investigations. Finally, the fact that the OG survives the completion
of any single investigation promotes efficient allocation of resources,
minimizes start-up costs and delays, and creates a collective memory which
may contribute to the adoption of efficient and effective organizational and
managerial procedures.
138 Ibid. at 2042.
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V. A ROLE FOR THE LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA
Currently the decision to appoint a commission of inquiry lies
within the sole discretion of the federal or provincial cabinet. Fearing
adverse political consequences, governments appear reluctant to establish
commissions of inquiry into matters that merit independent investigation.
This trend is solidifying at a time when opposition parties and the media
are increasingly becoming eager and opportunistic in their demands for the
appointment commissions of inquiry to further their short-term political
ambitions. Opposition parties and the media are primarily interested in the
"fault-finding" function of commissions and less interested in a
commission's role in public policy reform that might make such situations
less likely to reoccur.
If commissions of inquiry are to continue to secure political and
governmental accountability, steps should be taken to reduce or eliminate
the sole discretion of cabinets to establish commissions of inquiry.
Fundamental reform is required to better insulate the process of"start-up"
from short-term and partisan political pressures. A cooler, more deliberate
process should supplement cabinet decisions made in the midst of a real or
apparent political crisis. The demands by opposition parties and the media
for inquiries on today's hot-button issue would be better examined and
filtered through less partisan lenses. Although cabinet should not be
prevented from continuing to have the power to appoint a commission, this
power should be shared in cases that merit independent investigation to
formulate policy that seeks to minimize a recurrence of a particular public
crisis.
Although the Independent Counsel model is flawed in many
important respects, it does contain a number of features that merit closer
attention in the Canadian context. Most importantly, the model recognizes
the institutional disincentives to an administration launching an
independent review of its conduct or policies. It limits the discretion of
government actors by requiring a full investigation in specified
circumstances, and removes from government control the selection of the
investigator and the setting of prosecutorial jurisdiction, budget and
timeline.
The Inspector General model offers many valuable lessons. The
OIG may commence an investigation on its own motion. It also determines
the scope of the inquiry itself and may enlarge an investigation as its sees
fit. Its finite budget creates an institutional incentive to allocate sufficient,
but not excessive, resources to any particular investigation. The Office of
an Inspector General is a permanent institution dedicated to explaining
what happened and why. This permanence permits efficiency of operations
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and minimizes start-up costs and delays. It also places the 0IG in a position
to make recommendations for improved government operations, and to
monitor effectively government's response to these recommendations.
At the federal level, one possible reform would be to permit the
Senate to create commissions of inquiry. However, although senators stand
somewhat removed from the political fray, the partisan nature of their
appointment, combined with an apparent lack of public confidence in the
Senate itself, renders this model less than perfect. As we discuss below, the
Law Commission of Canada provides a deliberative forum better suited to
the exercise of discretion to establish commissions of inquiry and to set
their terms of reference.
A. Current Structure and Mandate
The Law Commission of Canada was established as a corporation
by legislation in 1996.'39 The preamble to the Law Commission of Canada
Act states that it is desirable to establish a commission to provide
independent advice on improvements, modernization, and reform of the
law based on the experience of a wide range of groups and individuals. The
Law Commission is to ensure its work is open, inclusive, accessible, and
understandable; multidisciplinary, in that the law and legal system is to be
viewed in a broad social and economic context; responsive and accountable
through partnerships; and efficient and effective when formulating
recommendations, taking into account cost-effectiveness and the impact of
the law on different groups and individuals.Y40
The Law Commission Act further provides that the purpose of the
Law Commission is to study, and keep under systematic review, the law and
its effects with a view to providing independent advice on improvements,
modernization and reform that will ensure ajust legal system that meets the
changing needs of society. This purpose includes the development of new
approaches to, and new concepts of, law; the development of measures to
make the legal system more efficient, economical and accessible; the
stimulation of critical debate in, and the forging of productive networks
among, academic and other communities in Canada in order to ensure
13 9 Law Comnmission of CanadaAct, S.C. 1996, c. 9, s. 2, proclaimed in force 21 April 1997 S.I,/97-
46, C. Gaz. 1997.11.1501 [hereinafter Law Commission Act].
14 0 Ibid., Preamble.
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cooperation and coordination; and the elimination of obsolete laws and
anomalies in the law.141
In order to accomplish its broad mandate, the Law Commission is
given a number of statutory powers including the powers to undertake and
initiate research, publish studies and reports, facilitate cooperative efforts
among the Commission, governments, the academic, and legal
communities, and expend any money provided by Parliament subject to any
terms on which it was provided (including the engagement of staff and
temporary specialized assistance) 42 The Law Commission also has the
ability to establish a study panel, consisting of persons having specialized
knowledge in, or particularly affected by the matter, for the purpose of
advising and assisting it with any particular project.4 3
The Law Commission is under a duty to consult with the minister
of justice with respect to its proposed annual program of studies and to
submit to the minister any reports completed." While it is free to design
its own agenda, the Law Commission shall prepare reports requested by the
minister. The minister is under an obligation to consult with the Law
Commission and to take its workload and resources into consideration
before requiring any report to be completed.1 45 The Law Commission is
accountable, through the minister of justice, to Parliament for the conduct
of its affairs.
The Law Commission consists of a full-time president and four
part-time commissioners who hold office at pleasure for a renewable term
not to exceed five years. 46 The commissioners may be drav from outside
the legal community, and are to receive advice on its strategic directions
and long-term programs of study from an advisory council consisting of
between twelve and twenty-four members that are "broadly representative
of the socio-economic and cultural diversity of Canada" serving three-year
terms at the pleasure of the government. 4" The advisory council is also
required to review the Law Commission's performance.
Ibid, s, 3.
142 Iid, ss. 4, 16.
143 Ibid., s. 20(1).
144 IbU~, s.5(1)(a) (c).
145 Ibid, s. 5(1)(b ) .
146Ibid, ss. 7(1), 7(4), 7(S), (1).
14 7 Ibid, ss. 13(1), 19.
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B. Necessary Structural Reforms
Establishing the Law Commission as a permanent base of
operations for commissions of inquiry into matters falling within federal
authority that merit independent policy assessment, would require a
number of changes to its enabling statute. Specifically, the Law Commission
Act would have to be amended to ensure: that Law Commissioners are
appointed for defined terms, removable only with cause; commissions of
inquiry established by the Law Commission possess the same powers
available to inquiries under the Inquiries Act; and to authorize the Law
Commission to establish commissions of inquiry into matters falling within
federal authority that merit independent policy assessment. On this last
point, one possible approach would be to create an automatic triggering
mechanism linked to allegations of criminality. For example, in a manner
similar to the Independent Counsel model, the statute could require the
Law Commission to appoint an inquiry in situations where credible
allegations had been made that federal officials had violated provisions of
the Criminal Code. Drawing from the American experience, one could
easily imagine drafting a list of persons and offences covered by such a
statute.
However, such an approach focuses on retrospective issues of
criminality at the expense of prospective policy formulation. It would force
a commission of inquiry to attempt to perform functions for which it is ill-
suited. Such an approach also invites federalism and Charter challenges
from individuals and organizations who fear criminal retribution. As the
judiciary has long maintained, commissions of inquiries should not be used
to create a parallel criminal justice system. Such investigations are better
left to traditional law enforcement agencies. Allegations of criminal
wrongdoing accordingly should not serve as an effective threshold or
triggering mechanism.
Instead, the Law Commission ought to be empowered to establish
an inquiry into matters falling within federal jurisdiction that merit
independent investigation to formulate policy that seeks to minimize a
recurrence of the events in question, whether the incident to be investigated
involves government misconduct, a disaster, a tragedy, the revelation of
systemic problems, or some other public crisis. For example, although
complicated by the constitutional distribution of legislative authority, 4 8the
148 See B. Ryder, Opinion Letter to Ms. Anne Pohl, Coalition for a Public Inquiry into Matters
Relating to the Death of Dudley George (12 March 1999) (on file with authors) (expressing opinion
that the federal government possesses the constitutional authority to establish a commission of inquiry
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purpose of a commission of inquiry into matters relating to the death of Mr.
George should not, and legally cannot, be to investigate named individuals
and assess their criminal or civil liability. Instead, an inquiry is necessary to
identify the causes of the death of Dudley George, to determine whether
his death could have been prevented, and to recommend means for
preventing the occurrence of similar events in the future. In this case, as in
most cases, the focus of an inquiry should be less on "who did what to
whom and when," and more on ensuring that such a death never happens
again.
C. Ensuring Efficient and Cost-Effective Conzmissions
One of the factors that makes governments reluctant to provide
commissions of inquiry Ath the necessary independence to make decisions
regarding the scope and duration of their work is the direct relationship
between these decisions and the ultimate cost of the inquiry. In an era of
significant reductions in the level of federal and provincial program
spending, governments are reluctant to provide the "blank check" that
nourishes the independence of an inquiry.
Currently, each new commission of inquiry is started from scratch
upon appointment and is dissolved entirely folloving the release of its
report. This has two effects: it ensures that each inquiry wastes time and
money during its start up phase; and it provides no institutional incentives
to keep costs dovn. The creation of a permanent base of operations in the
Law Commission would not only make individual inquiries more efficient
but it would make them more effective. It would eliminate the need to
develop separate organizational infrastructures. Mundane details, such as
office space, computer hardware and software, and telephone lines could
exist on a permanent basis and be amortized accordingly. The Law,
Commission could also be responsible for a group of ongoing
administrative functions such as accounting, financial management, hearing
scheduling, logistics, and media relations. Core administrative personnel
could provide these functions on a permanent basis ensuring a rapid and
smooth launch to each inquiryt4 9
Past commissions of inquiry have been compared to elephants in
that both are "big and slow moxing and tend to sit down and squash things.
into matters relating to the death of Dudley George).
149 Fora candid account of some of the administratne challenges faocd by the Royal C'emmi=on
on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster, see D.M. Grcnille,"The Role of the Commtzion Sccrctar$y"
in Conidssions qf nquini supra note 5 at 51-70.
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The only difference is [commissions] don't remember."'' 5 However, by
creating a permanent core organization in the Law Commission, individual
inquiries could benefit from a group of social science researchers and
investigators with a body of substantive and methodological expertise. Such
organizational competency could allow inquiries to produce superior work
in less time than presently required. This core group of investigators and
researchers would, of course, be supplemented by additional resource
persons as required by any particular inquiry.
If the Law Commission is invested with the discretionary power to
create commissions of inquiry, then it should also be funded through a
generous but fixed publicly-funded budget. Borrowing from the Inspector
General model, a global limit on spending would create institutional
incentives on the Law Commission to run inquiries efficiently and
effectively. It would also require the organization to carefully shepherd its
resources to ensure that they are allocated to pressing and substantial
public concerns and discipline the organization to focus on areas where it
could make a significant contribution to future policy development.
This approach is not without risks. First among them would be that
a budget set too low would limit the ability to do justice to any particular
inquiry or that the Law Commission would find itself without the necessary
resources to launch a needed inquiry that emerged late in the fiscal year.
Similarly, a government displeased with the work of the Law Commission
in general, or of a specific inquiry in particular, could simply starve the Law
Commission's inquiry operations during the next budget process and thus
limit its effectiveness.
Assuming that the cabinet retained power to appoint commissions
of inquiry on its own initiative, it would be preferable, for similar reasons
of efficacy and efficiency, for the cabinet also to utilize the Law
Commission's core operations. If this were the case, the design of budget
arrangements should ensure that a cabinet request for an inquiry did not
consume a disproportionate amount of the Law Commission's budget. One
possibility would be to require cabinet to allocate additional funds to the
Law Commission to support such initiatives.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fearing political embarrassment, no doubt governments would be
reluctant to cede control over their policy agenda to commissions of inquiry
1O D.R. Cameron, "Not Spicer and Not the B & B: Reflections of an Insider on the Workings
of the Pepin-Robarts Task Force on Canadian Unity" (1993) 7-8 I nt'l J. Can. Stud. 333 at 341.
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established by an independent agency such as the Law Commission of
Canada. This would be true particularly if they do not possess the ability to
wind-up a commission before its work was done. But fears of political
embarrassment do not justify turning a blind eye to the deaths of Mr.
George and Mr. Arone and the need to prevent similar tragedies in the
future. Moreover, a government may see some political benefits in being
relieved of the decision to establish a commission of inquiry. Instead of
shouldering sustained criticism for a failure to call an inquiry, a government
could legitimately claim that it is up to the Law Commission to determine
whether the circumstances in question merit independent investigation. By
designing the process so that it focuses more on forward-looking policy
development and less on the attribution of blame, governments can reduce
the possibility that independent investigations will result in adverse political
consequences.
For starters, any independent agency will have to ensure that the
interested parties, including the government, do not view the exercise as
inherently adversarial. An adversarial approach to policy formulation seems
unlikely to produce desired results. While appropriate to traditional forms
of private and public litigation, adversarial stances w.,ill only frustrate the
work of an inquiry. The government must come to see its role in the process
not as akin to a defendant in a quasi-judicial proceeding. Similarly, other
interested groups ought to be entitled to participate in a manner more
meaningful and equal than our present notions of standing envision. They
should be given a greater role within the policy-making function of an
inquiry than they presently enjoy. Because the focus of an inquiry's work
would be centered on prospective policy discussions in favour of
retrospective "fault-finding," participants would be required to take
seriously government representations with respect to the fiscal and policy
environment in which inquiry recommendations might be implemented.
Finally, in order to encourage good faith participation, participants should
be given the opportunity to review and respond to any inquiry findings of
fact prior to the release of its final report.
Absent meaningful reforms that address the perverse incentives
facing governments to start up and shut down commissions of inquiry, the
capacity of the commission of inquiry to secure political and governmental
accountability likely will continue to erode in the future. If so, Canadians
,ill have lost one of the most effective institutional mechanisms for the
formulation of public policy. In this article, we have argued that many of
the perverse incentives that governments face in relation to commissions
of inquiry can be eliminated by vesting an independent agency, such as the
Law Commission of Canada, with the authority to establish inquiries in
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certain circumstances on its own motion. If successful, this reform could
serve as a model for provincial law reform commissions in the future.
